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Abstract 
Body sensor networks (BSNs) for healthcare put more em-
phasis on security and adaptation to changes in context and 
application requirement. Policy-based management enables 
flexible adaptive behaviour by supporting dynamic loading, 
enabling and disabling of policies without shutting down 
nodes. This overcomes many of the limitations of sensor oper-
ating systems, such as TinyOS, which do not support dynamic 
modification of code. Alternative schemes for network adapta-
tion, such as networking programming, suffer from high com-
munication cost and operational interruption. In addition, the 
policy-driven approach enables fine-grained access control 
through specifying authorization policies. This paper presents 
an efficient policy system called Finger which enables policy 
interpretation and enforcement on distributed sensors to sup-
port sensor level adaptation and fine-grained access control. 
It features support for dynamic management of policies, mini-
mization of resources usage, high responsiveness and node 
autonomy. The policy system is integrated as a TinyOS com-
ponent, exposing simple, well-defined interfaces which can 
easily be used by application developers. The system perform-
ance in terms of processing latency and resource usage is 
evaluated.  
1. Introduction 
Body sensor networks (BSNs) [1-3] have recently been 
employed for various personal applications, in particular 
healthcare applications [4]. In a BSN, biomedical sen-
sors are attached to, or possibly implanted in, patients to 
monitor physiological parameters continuously for 
health management. Abnormal events indicating coro-
nary problems such as high heart rate or blood pressure 
can be detected and reported to a doctor for immediate 
medical actions. Such BSNs are particularly suitable for 
post-operative care in hospitals and for treatment of 
chronically ill or aged patients at home.  
There is typically little functional redundancy be-
tween the nodes in a BSN compared to a large-scale 
sensor network, e.g., for environment monitoring where 
most nodes perform similar functions and have the same 
sensors. BSNs exhibit several unique requirements 
when compared to traditional sensor networks. First, 
sensors in a healthcare BSN often need to adapt their 
behaviours to changes in the patient’s medical condition 
or activity. The sensors should be configured accord-
ingly to reflect such changes. For example, when a pa-
tient is suspected to have a cold, the temperature sensors 
should become more sensitive and report more tempera-
ture data for better monitoring. In some situations, the 
doctor may want more detail on blood sugar level of the 
patient, so glucose sensors which have been turned off 
for power conservation must be enabled.  
Second, security is crucial for practical use of BSNs 
in healthcare where privacy concerns about access to a 
patient’s health condition data can be important. Pre-
venting unauthorised access to actuators, such as insulin 
or other drug pumps, may be even more critical as this 
involves the patient’s safety. However, there is a need 
for different types of medical staff to have differentiated 
privileges with respect to access of a patient’s sensors 
and actuators. There is also the need to protect against 
malicious attackers, particularly for celebrities and other 
high profile patients. Only authorized access to body 
sensors should be permitted, for both accessing data and 
performing actions.  
Little existing work fulfils the above requirements. 
TinyOS [5], the de facto standard operating system for 
sensors, does not support dynamic modification of code 
once the program is deployed. Thus, it is difficult for a 
sensor to adapt its behaviour – a typical solution is to 
shut down the network and reprogram the sensors. Most 
network programming protocols [6-8] require the whole 
program code image to be disseminated to the sensors 
through wireless communications. This not only incurs 
large overhead of wireless communication, which is the 
main source of power consumption on sensors, but also 
interrupts the current operation of the network. For data 
confidentiality, symmetric cryptography has been used 
in sensor networks. Key management schemes [9-11] 
ensure that sensors trying to communicate with each 
other share common keys. However, such approaches 
achieve only data confidentiality but do not perform 
access control on individual nodes.  
Policy-driven management has been widely recog-
nized as an important technology for managing distrib-
uted systems [12]. By separating policies from the sys-
tem implementation, a policy-driven system can adapt 
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Figure 1: The policy service architecture for body sen-
sor networks.  Each sensor maintains its own policies 
and implements both PDP and PEP. 
to changes by dynamically changing policies. In addi-
tion, fine-grained access control can also be realized by 
making use of authorization policies. We have devel-
oped a policy-based system [4, 13] for pervasive health-
care, which use a PDA as a coordinator that provides 
functions, such as discovery of sensors, event routing 
and external remote communication. It uses a policy 
system called Ponder2 [14] which runs on the relatively 
powerful PDA hosting a java virtual machine environ-
ment. Sensors are treated as passive, managed objects, 
polled at regular intervals for readings.  
Sensor nodes are becoming increasingly powerful 
[15] and can implement a policy system to support intel-
ligent sensing services. For example, sensors can gener-
ate events indicating thresholds have been exceeded. 
Moreover, they can adapt their behaviours in response 
to context changes or application requirement evolve-
ment. For example, a sensor adapts to the current activ-
ity of the user. Direct interaction between sensors be-
comes possible and at the same time, accesses to sensor 
resources are regulated by authorization policies.  
This paper presents the design of Finger, an effi-
cient policy system running on sensors. This system 
supports interpretation and enforcement of both obliga-
tion policies, which are event-condition-action rules that 
perform an action in response to an event, and authori-
sation policies, which define what resources or services 
a subject can access on a target sensor. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, each sensor manages its own policies and im-
plements both a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and a Pol-
icy Enforcement Point (PEP). A PDP interprets policies 
and makes policy decisions. Following the decision 
made by the PDP, the PEP enforces the policy, i.e., it 
invokes the action specified by the obligation policy, or 
permits/denies a subject from performing a requested 
action. In essence, Finger supports a considerably sim-
plified version of the Ponder2 language for policy speci-
fication [14]. The effective simplification makes the 
policy language suitable for processing on resource-
constrained sensors.  
2. Motivation 
A BSN consists of a controller, body sensors, and pos-
sibly dynamic nodes. The controller manages the whole 
network and can be a PDA or a Smartphone, which is 
relatively powerful, compared to sensors. Body sensors 
are attached on the body or implanted within the body 
for monitoring various aspects of body condition. A 
body sensor is subject to severe resource constraints as 
it has small memory and limited processing capability. 
Dynamic nodes represent medics, such as nurses and 
doctors, which may intermittently interact with a patient 
BSN for short periods to obtain readings or change set-
tings. Finger is intended for the platform of body sensor 
node [16], equipped with a TI MSP430F149 microcon-
troller of a 16-bit RISC processor working at 16MHz. It 
has only 60KB, read-only program memory for execu-
table code and 2KB data memory as a data stack.  
Motivating Example.  Consider a simple healthcare 
scenario where a BSN is attached to a user for on-body 
monitoring. In the network, there are a controller, a 
temperature sensor and an accelerometer sensor which 
can be used to determine user activity, e.g., walking or 
sitting. The controller typically performs important 
tasks such as data aggregation, policy deployment and 
security management. 
To detect the activity of the user, an accelerometer 
sensor starts a timer and regularly (e.g., every 5 sec-
onds) reads accelerometer data. The timer frequency is 
an important parameter that determines the ability of 
detecting activity changes. A higher frequency allows 
the sensor to detect more rapid movement changes but 
then costs the sensor more energy. It is intuitive that 
when the acceleration is over a certain threshold, it is 
likely that the user is starting to walk. Thus, a sensor 
should increase its measurement frequency so that more 
data can be obtained for more accurate estimation. 
When the acceleration becomes smaller, it is probable 
that the user is sitting or standing. Thus, the measure-
ment rate can be reduced for energy conservation. Two 
obligation policies, (1) and (2) shown in the table, can 
realize such adaptation. The important parameter of the 
measurement interval can be re-configured according to 
application requirements by updating the two policies. 
The controller often needs to re-configure the sensor 
network by changing policies on sensors. Policy man-
agement tasks include loading, unloading, enabling and 
disabling policies. Thus, the accelerometer sensor 
should have an authorization policy (policy (3)) to allow 
the controller to change its policies.  
oblig  on accel_event (acceleration) 
(1) do adjust_measurement_interval (1s) 
 if acceleration >= 30   
oblig  on accel_event (acceleration) 
(2) do adjust_measurement_interval (5s) 
 if acceleration <= 20  
auth+ subject controller 
(3) target acceleration_sensor 
 action manage_policy    
This example demonstrates that sensors must fre-
quently adapt to both context changes and application 
requirements. They also need to cooperate with each 
other to achieve application goals. Obligation and au-
thorization policies provide a flexible and easily modi-
fied means of specifying what interactions must be per-
formed and what interactions are permitted.  
Design Objectives.  There are a number of chal-
lenges in implementing a policy system on small sen-
sors. It is critical to make efficient use of the limited 
resources such as small memory. Policy based systems 
such as Ponder2 are inappropriate for resource con-
strained sensors. It is also impractical to pre-load all 
required policies so dynamic management of policies 
with each node responsible for maintaining and manag-
ing its own policies is required, i.e., it must be possible 
to load, unload, enable and disable policies but at the 
same time protect these important operations from un-
authorised access. In the processing of developing Fin-
ger, we have considered several design objectives as 
important, including dynamic management of policies, 
minimum memory footprint, responsiveness, well de-
fined APIs and energy efficiency.  
3. Design of Finger 
The architectural overview is depicted in Figure 2. The 
core of Finger comprises two components, i.e., the Ob-
ligation Interpreter (OI) and the Authorization Inter-
preter (AI) for interpreting and enforcing obligation 
policies and authorization policies, respectively. Both 
the OI and the AI provide a repository for storing poli-
cies but the dynamic management of stored policies is 
implemented in an independent component that pro-
vides policy management actions. By this means, re-
quests to managing policies on a sensor can be governed 
by authentication and authorisation checks as normal 
requests.  
The OI receives events generated from the internal 
TinyOS components controlling sensors, e.g., tempera-
ture sensors, as well as external events received as in-
coming messages from the network. It can perform ac-
tions on software or hardware components within the 
node. An action on a software component could gener-
ate an event or message to be sent out to the network. 
On receiving an event, the OI searches the policy re-
pository for all policies matching the event type. It then 
checks whether the condition part of the corresponding 
obligation policy evaluates to true and if so, the OI in-
vokes the specified action through the Action interface.  
All incoming requests from external nodes are 
checked for authentication and authorisation. Incoming 
requests could be either an incoming event or a request 
to perform an action on a hardware or software compo-
nent, including policy management operations. Incom-
ing requests are of the form <subject, action, # of paras, 
paras>. The Request Manager (RM) receives incoming 
requests and authenticates the requesting subject by 
invoking the Authentication Manager (AM). The design 
of this module is discussed in the next subsection.  
If the subject is authenticated, the request is passed to 
the AI via the ProcessRequest interface. The AI then 
searches its authorization policies. If a policy for the 
subject and the requested action is found, the associated 
condition is checked and if positive, the associated ac-
tion is then invoked. For incoming, authorized events, 
the associated action is treated as raising an event. The 
first parameter of the request indicates the event type 
and the second one indicates the event value. The AI 
invokes, through the RaiseExternalEvents interface, the 
ExternalEventsM component, which then triggers the OI.  
3.1. Authentication Protocol 
To make access control effective, the target node must 
authenticate the requesting node before making the au-
thorization decision. The requesting node presents the 
target node the information of <ID, role>. The AM must 
decide whether the requester really possesses the ID and 
whether it has the claimed role. In Figure 3, a simple 
example is illustrated. The example BSN consists of a 
controller and four sensors. Sensor 3 sends a request to 
sensor 4 which is to authenticate sensor 3.  
We have developed an efficient authentication proto-
col based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement. 
Both public-key and symmetric cryptography are em-
ployed. In the initialization phase, each sensor i gene-
rates a secret si, and computes a keyshare pi based on its 
secret, isip g= . It is computationally infeasible to re-
cover the secret, given the keyshare. The sensor obtains 
the group key from the controller, and exchanges its 
keyshare with the controller. The channel by which the 
group key is obtained and the keyshares are exchanged 
is physically secure e.g., by plugging it into the control-
ler’s USB port.  
The controller creates and maintains a membership 
list of node ID, role and keyshare. Using the group key, 
the controller can periodically publish the membership 
to all members in the network whenever there are 
changes in the membership. The controller encrypts the 
membership list only once for each release and this only 
incurs a single broadcast transmission. All the sensors in 
the network can decrypt the membership list using the 
group key. However, this is based on the assumption 
that nodes having been admitted into the network do not 
behave maliciously by spoofing the membership list.  
 
Figure 2. The architectural overview of Finger.  
With the membership list, a pair of sensors i and j 
can then establish a pairwise shared key Kij. Sensor i 
computes the shared key as follows,  
( ) ( ) ii j i jss s s sij jK p g g= = = . (1) 
Sensor j can compute Kij in a similar way. The group 
key is renewed whenever a member is detected to have 
left the network or been compromised, or when it has 
been used for an extended period of time. When renew-
ing the group key, the controller sends the new group 
key to every member individually. The new key is en-
crypted using the shared key of the controller and each 
member.  
With the pairwise shared key, we develop a chal-
lenge-response exchange procedure for a sensor to au-
thenticate a requesting node. Consider the scenario in 
the example that sensor 4 wants to authenticate sensor 3. 
The process is initiated by sensor 3 sending a request to 
sensor 4. Sensor 4 can compute the pairwise shared key 
K43 according to (1). Sensor 4 then challenges sensor 3 
by sending its nonce encrypted with the shared key K34. 
Sensor 3 should decrypt the encrypted nonce and re-
spond with a (nonce +1) encrypted with the shared key. 
Sensor 4 authenticates sensor 3 if the response content 
is indeed (nonce + 1).  
The three-way handshake is costly since it introduces 
two additional communications. This not only wastes 
power but also introduces overall latency for request 
processing. We propose a ticket technique to avoid 
three-way handshake each time a request is processed. 
After the authentication is passed successfully, sensor 4 
creates a ticket which is essentially a random number 
and sends it to sensor 3. Later, each time sensor 3 re-
quests an action on sensor 4, it increases the ticket by 
one and appends it to the request. Sensor 4 decrypts the 
request and checks the ticket. If the ticket is indeed the 
ticket plus one, it is able to ensure that the requesting 
node is sensors 3. Such a ticket is renewed, through the 
target starting a new challenge-response procedure, after 
it has been used for an extended period.  
The exponential notations in the DH-based protocol 
are for conceptual description only. Exponential compu-
tation with big integers is too computationally expen-
sive for body sensors. Instead, we make an efficient 
implementation based on elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC). 
4. Implementation  
We have implemented Finger using nesC [17] with 
TinyOS v1.15 on the platform of body sensor node [16]. 
This section describes several important aspects of Fin-
ger implementation.   
We have to scale down the complexity of policies 
since small sensors cannot afford to process complex 
policies used in traditional distributed systems. We have 
designed a simple and efficient policy language with a 
syntax suitable for efficient processing by body sensors 
yet it is expressive and able to fulfil most management 
needs of sensor networks. An obligation policy specifies 
the event, the action and the condition under which this 
action must be performed. Note that an action is also 
associated with several parameters to be used when this 
action is invoked. An authorization policy defines the 
subject, the target, the action and the condition. A sub-
ject or target is a role in a domain hierarchy. Details of 
how nodes are discovered and assigned to roles are de-
scribed in [4]. The policies used in the motivating ex-
ample can be specified as shown in Table 1. For policy 
(1) the first “0” indicates it is an obligation policy and 
“#1” is its ID. The obligation-triggering event “1?” re-
fers to the acceleration event. The condition ≥ 30 refers 
to the acceleration context variable “1^”. The obligation 
has an action of “1” to adjust measurement interval and 
the action takes a parameter of “1”.  
Dynamic management of policies is crucial to the ad-
aptation ability of sensors. As discussed, management 
operations are treated as regular authorization requests 
and are controlled by authorization policies. Authorized 
management requests result in performing an action on 
the ManagePoliciesActionM component. This component 
implements all policy management operations and pro-
vides the Action interface to the AI. The first parameter 
of the action is used to indicate the type of policy man-
agement, i.e., loading, unloading, enabling or disabling. 
For loading a policy, the second parameter is a string 
containing the policy text. For the other three types, the 
second parameter indicates the ID of the policy to be 
operated. To load a policy, the management component 
parses the policy text by invoking the PolicyTextParser 
component. Through the PolicyControl interface, the re-
sultant parsed policy is passed to the AI or the OI, and 
then inserted into the available policies. The two types 
( )00 0, ss p g=
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Figure 3: Diffie-Hellman based key establishment, 
and three-way handshake authentication procedure  
TABLE 1: POLICY TEXTS  
“0 # 1 & 1 ? 1^ >=30 ~ 1 (1)” (1) 
“0 # 2 & 1 ? 1^ <=20 ~ 1 (5)” (2) 
“1 # 6 & 0 @ 1 ? always ~ 5” (3) 
of enabling and disabling add flexibility but reduce 
communication cost.  
To overcome the heavy cost of exponential computa-
tion in the traditional DH key agreement protocol, we 
exploit the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EEC) to im-
plement the authentication protocol. ECC public-key 
cryptography has much shorter key length and less 
computation overhead than RSA. We slightly modified 
the TinyECC [18] package to migrate it to the platform 
of body sensor node. We implemented the authentica-
tion protocol using point multiplication in ECC. First, a 
base point is chosen and made publicly known to all 
sensors. Next, each sensor i generates a random point as 
its secret si. The keyshare pi of sensor i is computed by 
multiplying secret si with the base point G, pi=siG. To 
compute the pairwise shared key with of sensor i, sensor 
j multiplies its own secret with the keyshare of sensor i, 
Kji = sj(pi) = sjsiG. In a similar way, sensor i can com-
pute the shared key with j, Kij = si(pj) = sisjG = Kji. Al-
though a point on an elliptic curve is two dimensional 
and represented by (x, y), only the x value is used to 
generate the shared key. The x value is hashed to pro-
duce a 160-bit key as the pairwise shared symmetric key. 
We adopted Skipjack, implemented in TinySec [19], for 
symmetric encryption with a 160 bit key length. Skip-
jack is a block-cipher with the block size of 8 bytes. We 
use the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) operation mode 
with non-repeating Initialisation Vector (IV). The bat-
tery level or sensor readings can be used as the seed of a 
pseudo-random number generator to generate the IV. 
Finger provides easy-to-use application programming 
interfaces (APIs) to application developers. The compo-
nents of Finger are packaged as a single TinyOS con-
figuration component, called FingerC, which hides the 
implementation details of Finger from developers. 
Three TinyOS interfaces are exposed as shown in Fig-
ure 4. To use policies FingerC should be included in the 
application configuration. The Main module of the appli-
cation wires its StdControl to that of the policy system, 
which initializes the embedded components with Finger. 
Note that, the policy system provides only a small set of 
basic event sources and actions, such as temperature 
event and data report action. To extend the functional-
ity, application-specific event sources and actions can 
be developed. Event sources should connect to the 
EventSource interface to trigger obligation policies. 
Similarly, all actions to be regulated by authorization 
policies should connect to the Action interface.  
5. Performance Evaluation 
To facilitate performance measurements, we developed 
a simple TinyOS application SimApp making use of 
Finger. This application implements an event source of 
acceleration, and two actions which toggle the red light 
and the green light, respectively. An obligation policy is 
deployed for this event, which specifies that the green 
light be toggled when the acceleration is larger than a 
threshold. It also has an authorization policy which con-
trols accesses to the red light action.  
We investigate memory overhead solely introduced 
by Finger. More specifically, we look at the ROM and 
RAM sizes. Nevertheless, it is difficult to compute the 
binary code size of Finger precisely since in TinyOS we 
only have access to the aggregate code size of an entire 
application. We need to separate the Finger’s code from 
basic TinyOS and communication components. We 
propose a technique of taking difference of SimApp 
with other simple TinyOS programs. SimApp is so sim-
ple that it adds little memory overhead. Its code size is 
approximately equal to the size of Finger plus the 
TinyOS basics and the communication subsystem. To 
compute the sizes of TinyOS basics and the communi-
cation subsystem, we use two other simple applications. 
Blink is a simple application that regularly toggles the 
red light. It only contains the basic TinyOS components. 
CntToRadio is also a simple application that maintains a 
counter and periodically broadcasts the counter value, 
so it includes the components for both basic TinyOS 
and the communication subsystem. By taking the code 
size difference between SimApp with the two basic ap-
plications, we can derive the code size of Finger. The 
ECC and TinySec libraries require considerable memo-
ry. In order to evaluate the core policy system, which 
solely interprets and enforces obligation and authoriza-
tion policies, we used two versions of the policy system, 
Finger(w) and Finger(w/o) – with and without authenti-
cation, respectively.  
We exploited the timing facility provided by TinyOS 
to measure processing delays precisely, and all meas-
urements were directly made on the sensor running the 
policy system. We developed a TinyOS module Measu-
reTimeM for delay measurement. It employs the system 
interface LocalTime provided by the TimerC hardware 
module. This interface allows us to read the current lo-
cal time on the sensor. Our measurement component  
records timestamps and sends them back to the PC end 
for delay calculation. This guarantees that no other de-
lays are included in calculated processing delays. The 
results each are averaged over 20 measurements.  
All optimization switches of TinyECC were turned 
on for minimization of processing latency. However, 
 
Figure 4: The exposed TinyOS interfaces to be used 
by application developers. 
some of the switches can be turned off to trade memory 
consumption for cryptography performance. Note that, a 
body sensor node has only 2K bytes ROM so cannot 
host Finger(w), so we had to use a Tmote Sky node in-
stead for experiments with Finger(w). A Tmote node 
shares the same processor with a body sensor, but it has 
a larger RAM size (with 10K bytes).  
The resultant memory size of Finger is dependent on 
the maximum number of policies deployed. All the fol-
lowing measurements are based on a maximum number 
of 20 policies. We compiled SimApp into TinyOS ex-
ecutable on the body sensor node platform. The execu-
table without authentication occupies 15.62K bytes of 
ROM and 1.06K bytes of RAM, and the one with au-
thentication occupies 31.28K bytes of ROM and 2.88K 
bytes of RAM. We calculate that the authentication 
module using TinyECC takes 15.66K bytes of ROM 
and 1.82K bytes of RAM. 
We examine various processing delays introduced by 
the policy system. The experiments were conducted 
with the seven deployed obligation policies and eight 
deployed authorization policies. The obligation interpre-
tation delay is measured from the time the OI is trig-
gered by an event source to the time the OI invokes the 
corresponding action. The authorization interpretation 
delay is from the time when the RM passes an incoming 
request to the AI to the time when the AI invokes the 
associated action. From the table we can see that it takes 
as little as 62 µs to process an obligation policy and 81 
µs to process an authorization policy. We also measured 
the latency caused by policy management. It takes 375 
µs to load an authorization policy. Thus, it takes in total 
437 µs to process a loading-policy request and load the 
policy. We also evaluated delays for various crypto-
graphic operations in the authentication process. With 
TinyECC, it takes on average 9530 ms to encrypt a 52-
byte message, whose content are randomly generated, 
and 5281 ms to decrypt the encrypted message. With the 
Skipjack library, it takes significantly less time, 150 µs 
to encrypt the same message and 90 µs to decrypt the 
encrypted message. This big difference shows that it is 
essential to use shared keys for most encryption.  
6. Conclusions 
We have presented a novel policy system called Finger 
for BSNs. Finger supports efficient on-node interpreta-
tion and enforcement of both obligation and authoriza-
tion policies. It realizes policy-based dynamic adapta-
tion to changes in context or application requirements 
without interrupting the current network operation. 
Fine-grained access control is also enabled such that 
sensitive data or operations can be protected against 
unauthorized access. Performance measurements of 
Finger indicate that it is viable and practical for re-
source-constrained BSNs. With Finger, application de-
velopment can also be accelerated since developers only 
need to focus on developing event sources and actions, 
and composing policies. Although Finger has been im-
plemented for the body sensor platform, it is extensible 
and can be deployed to many other platforms including 
Mica2, Telos and TMote Sky.  
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